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In a well-known story constructed by Saul Kripke (1979), Pierre, a rational but monolingual Frenchman who has never visited England, acquires, on the evidence of many magazine pictures of London, the belief that London is beautiful. He is happy to declare ‘Londres est jolie’. Pierre eventually moves to England and settles in one of the seedier areas of London, travelling only to comparably shabby neighbourhoods. He learns English by immersion, though he does not realize that ‘London’ and ‘Londres’ are co-referential. Naturally enough, given his current circumstances, he acquires a belief that he is only too willing to express by uttering ‘It is not the case that London is beautiful’.  So apparently he now holds contradictory beliefs. But rational people do not hold contradictory beliefs…..
	One popular response to Kripke’s puzzle is that people sometimes do hold contradictory beliefs (e.g., Salmon 1989, Williams 1981). I may believe that p1, p2,….. pn and also believe that ~q. It may take a Sherlock Holmes to reveal that {p1, p2,….. pn} entails q. I am not irrational for failing to possess the deductive power of Holmes. Therefore Pierre (so the response goes) is not irrational in both believing that it is not the case that London is beautiful and, at the same time, believing that London is beautiful. It is just that, through no fault of his own, he has not ‘put two and two together’, has not realized that ‘London’ refers to the same town as ‘Londres’.
The above response, though plausible, is unhelpful. To see why, consider how a rational person, antecedently believing that ~q and also that p1, p2,……. pn, would respond, on being shown by Holmes that {p1, p2,……. pn} entails that q. That person, agreeing with Holmes that each member of the set {p1, p2,……. pn} is unproblematically true, would give up the belief that ~q. But would Pierre, on learning that London is Londres, give up the belief that London is beautiful in favour of the belief that it is not, or vice versa? He would do neither. His evidence for the proposition that London is beautiful is strong and, we may suppose, is roughly equal in strength to that of the evidence for the negation of that proposition. Try to imagine what Pierre, rational, intelligent man that he is, really would do. He would, most likely, smile self-deprecatingly at his own impetuousness.  He would realise that the evidence for each of his two beliefs, though strong, was not strong enough. Those who know London know that it is beautiful in parts, but other parts of the town are anything but beautiful. Pierre (as he now realizes) should have considered that possibility before jumping to any rash conclusions.
Kripke says that Pierre should not be held to higher standards than the rest of us when it comes to acquiring beliefs. For example, Pierre’s evidence for the belief that it is not the case that London is beautiful is as strong as that of his London neighbours’ who hold the same belief, and so, says Kripke, he is as much entitled to that belief as they are. True​ – but what does that tell us? That the neighbours too should be more circumspect. The lesson of Kripke’s puzzle (and it is a very elementary one) is that Pierre, his neighbours and the rest of us must try harder when forming beliefs. For, if we do not, then we are likely, on the basis of insufficient evidence, to come to believe (for example) that David Cameron would be suitable for the job of Prime Minister, that Manchester City is the greatest football team on Earth, that right is exclusively on the Palestinian <Israeli> side in the Middle East conflict, or that God exists.
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